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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Christopher C. Tapp appeals from the district court's order dismissing his 
petition for post-conviction relief following a prior remand. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Underlying Criminal Proceedings1 
The state charged Tapp with, and a jury convicted him of, first-degree 
murder, rape, and a weapon enhancement for use of a deadly weapon during the 
commission of the murder and rape of Angie Dodge in her apartment in Idaho 
Falls. State v. Tapp, 136 Idaho 354, 33 P.3d 828 (Ct. App. 2001). Prior to trial, 
Tapp filed a motion to suppress statements he made to police during various 
interviews, which the district court granted in part and denied in part. (#25295 R., 
Vol. 11, pp.198-99.) The Idaho Court of Appeals set forth the facts underlying the 
suppression issue as follows: 
Early in the morning of June 13, 1996, Angie Dodge was 
raped and stabbed to death in her apartment in Idaho Falls. On 
January 7, 1997, twenty-year-old Christopher Tapp voluntarily 
submitted to police questioning about this crime at the Law 
Enforcement Building (LEB) in Idaho Falls. Tapp again voluntarily 
went to the LES for questioning on January 10. After this interview, 
1 The Idaho Supreme Court has entered an order taking judicial notice of "the 
Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript filed in prior appeal No. 35536, Tapp v. 
State." (Order Taking Judicial Notice, dated July 30, 2012.) Consequently, the 
Court ordered preparation of only a limited clerk's record and reporter's transcript 
for this appeal. (Id.) In the prior appeal, pursuant to Tapp's motion, the Idaho 
Supreme Court also took judicial notice of "the Clerk's Record, Reporter's 
Transcript and court file" in Tapp's underlying criminal case, "State v. Christopher 
Conley Tapp, Supreme Court Docket No. 25295-1999." The state notes that the 
trial court also previously took judicial notice of "the underlying criminal file CR-
97-481." (#35536 R., Vol. 11, p.194.) 
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Tapp's parents retained private counsel for their son. When Tapp 
did not appear at the LEB for another scheduled interview on 
January 11, police officers went to his home to find him. They were 
informed by Tapp's mother that an attorney had been retained and 
that Tapp would appear on January 13, with counsel, to answer 
more questions. Approximately one hour later, the Idaho Falls chief 
of police arrived at the Tapp home and attempted to convince 
Tapp's mother to change her mind about her son's refusal to be 
interviewed without assistance of counsel. She refused. Rather 
than waiting for a voluntary interview on January 13, law 
enforcement officials obtained a warrant to arrest Tapp on a charge 
of accessory to a felony, Idaho Code §§ 18-205, -206, and he was 
arrested on January 11. 
After making the arrest, an officer put Tapp in an interview 
room and called Tapp's attorney. Before the attorney's arrival, the 
officer initiated a discussion with Tapp about the type of information 
the police wanted to obtain from him. On January 13, another 
attorney joined in Tapp's representation as co-counsel. Thereafter, 
Tapp was interviewed, while under arrest and in police custody, on 
January 15 and 17. During all interviews at the LEB from January 
15 forward, Tapp was separated from his attorneys. The attorneys 
were placed in a nearby office in the LEB where they were allowed 
to observe the interviews on a closed-circuit television. Tapp's only 
contact with his attorneys was during breaks in the interviews. His 
attorneys apparently made no objection to this arrangement. 
In the first interviews Tapp denied having any knowledge of 
the crime, then claimed that Ben Hobbs had confessed to killing 
Dodge and had asked Tapp to help him with an alibi. Tapp denied 
having ever been at the crime scene. By January 15 and 17, 
however, Tapp's story was changing, and he admitted that he had 
accompanied Hobbs to Dodge's apartment on the night of the 
murder. Tapp told police that Hobbs wanted to confront Dodge 
because Hobbs believed that she had convinced Hobbs's wife to 
leave him. Tapp claimed that Hobbs and Dodge started fighting 
and that Hobbs punched Dodge and then stabbed her twice. Tapp 
asserted that he ran from the apartment at that point. He admitted 
that he returned later and found Dodge dead and no one else 
present. Tapp also implicated a man named Jeremy Sargis in the 
crime. Tapp said he believed that the murder weapon belonged to 
Sargis, but he initially claimed that Sargis was not in the apartment 
that night. Eventually, however, Tapp accused Sargis of helping to 
rape and murder Dodge. 
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On January 15, Tapp and the State entered into a "limited 
use immunity" agreement, and on January 17 they entered into a 
"cooperation and settlement agreement." These agreements 
(hereinafter referred to collectively as the "immunity agreements") 
required Tapp to cooperate with the police investigation of Dodge's 
death and to provide the police with truthful information about the 
crime. Tapp also agreed to plead guilty to aiding and abetting an 
aggravated battery, a felony, I.C. §§ 18-903, -907, and the State 
agreed not to file any other charge against Tapp related to Dodge's 
death. The State also promised to recommend at the sentencing 
hearing that the district court retain jurisdiction for a limited period 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601 (4), and to allow withdrawal of the guilty 
plea if the judge did not follow the recommendation. The State also 
agreed not to use any of Tapp's statements against him except for 
impeachment purposes. As a consequence of the immunity 
agreements, the pending charge against Tapp for accessory to 
felony was dismissed on January 17 and he was released from 
custody. 
Tapp was again questioned on January 18 and 29. Before 
the January 29 interview began, the prosecutor informed Tapp and 
his attorney that the prosecutor considered the immunity 
agreements with Tapp to be void because Tapp had not been 
truthful in describing the crime. The prosecutor explained that 
Tapp's contention that Hobbs and Sargis were the rapists was 
contradicted by DNA tests showing that semen found on Dodge's 
body and clothing did not come from either of those men (or from 
Tapp). Despite this declaration from the prosecutor, Tapp and one 
of his attorneys continued with the January 29 interview. On that 
date, Tapp was given a polygraph test, during which he asked to be 
taken to the apartment where the murder occurred. Tapp's 
attorney agreed that the police could take Tapp to the crime scene 
for further questioning, but the attorney declined to accompany 
Tapp and the officers. Once at the crime scene, Tapp made 
statements implicating himself in the crimes. At the crime scene 
and later the same day at the LEB, Tapp admitted that he had held 
Dodge's arms and shoulders down throughout the rape and 
stabbing. In his new account of the events, Jeremy Sargis was 
replaced by a different male whose name Tapp could not 
remember. Some details of his story about how Dodge was raped 
and details of other events of that night changed during this and 
two subsequent interviews. 
Tapp was rearrested after the January 29 interview. The 
next day, he was again charged with being an accessory to a 
3 
felony. Tapp was further interviewed on January 30 and 31. On 
February 3, 1997, charges of rape, I.C. § 18-6101(3), (4), and first 
degree murder, I.C. §§ 18-4001, -4002, -4003(a), replaced the 
accessory charge. 
Tapp moved to suppress the statements that he made to 
police on the grounds that his right to counsel was violated during 
police interviews, that his statements to police were involuntary, 
and that the immunity agreements were still binding on the State. 
Before this motion was decided, Tapp's original attorneys withdrew 
and other attorneys were appointed to represent him. The district 
court denied the suppression motion except as to statements made 
on January 11 after Tapp was arrested and before his attorney's 
arrival. 
To.rm, 136 Idaho at 357-58, 33 P.3d at 831-32 (footnote omitted). 
On appeal, Tapp challenged the district court's order denying his motion to 
suppress. (#25295 Appellant's Brief, pp.11-60.) The Court of Appeals 
concluded Tapp's "Fifth Amendment right to counsel was violated by police 
procedures in [his] case" when counsel were only permitted to watch the 
interviews from another room. Ifilm, 136 Idaho at 362, 33 P.3d at 836. 
However, this did not require suppression of all of Tapp's statements. Because 
"[t]he parties agree[d] that Tapp was not in custody during the January 7, 10 and 
18 interviews ... there was no Miranda violation as to those interrogations," and 
suppression was not required. kl With respect to the remaining interviews, the 
Court of Appeals concluded: 
As to the January 11 interview, the record shows that, except for 
the portion of the interview that was suppressed by the district 
court, Tapp's attorney was present with him in the same room 
during questioning. Therefore, Tapp has shown no violation of the 
right to counsel on January 11. The interviews of January 15, 17, 
30, and 31 all occurred while Tapp was incarcerated and formally 
charged, and it is undisputed that these were custodial 
interrogations during which Tapp was separated from his counsel. 
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Therefore, all statements Tapp made to police on these dates 
should have been suppressed. 
The parties disagree as to whether Tapp was "in custody" 
during the January 29 questioning, which occurred at the LEB and 
at the crime scene. The district court made no express finding of 
fact on the issue, .... 
It is clear that Tapp was not under formal arrest at the time 
of his January 29 interviews. However, formal arrest is not a 
factual prerequisite to a finding of custody. For Miranda purposes, 
"custody" occurs when a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to 
a degree associated with formal arrest. This is an objective test 
that is based on the totality of the circumstances; the inquiry is how 
a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood 
his situation. 
The surrounding circumstances establish that Tapp was not 
"in custody" when he was interrogated by police on January 29. 
Tapp initially appeared voluntarily at the LEB on that date with 
counsel and was told at the outset that the prosecutor considered 
the immunity agreements to be void. Despite this development, 
Tapp did not decline further interviews or invoke his privilege 
against self-incrimination. There is no evidence that the police ever 
told Tapp that he could not leave or that he had to undergo 
interrogation. At no time during questioning was he under arrest or 
led to believe that he was under arrest. In fact, an officer at one 
point told Tapp that although it was likely he would eventually be 
going to prison, he wasn't going to be put in jail that day. Tapp 
himself asked to be taken to the crime scene, where the interview 
continued and where he ultimately made some of his most self-
incriminating statements. His attorney was invited, but declined, to 
accompany him. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the 
district court did not implicitly find that Tapp was in custody during 
the January 29 interviews, and if such a finding had been made, it 
would not be supported by the record. We hold that Tapp was not 
in custody on January 29, and therefore his Fifth Amendment right 
to counsel did not attach and was not violated. Only Tapp's 
statements made on January 15, 17, 30, and 31 are suppressible 
for Fifth Amendment violations. 
Ifilill., 136 Idaho at 362-36, 33 P.3d at 836-37 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted, emphasis in original). 
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Tapp also claimed his statements were used in violation of his due 
process rights based on his assertion the statements were coerced and 
involuntary. Ifilm, 136 Idaho at 63, 33 P.3d at 838. The Court concluded the 
statements made during the interviews on January 7, 10, 18, and 29 were not 
suppressible under the Fourteenth Amendment. kt_ In reaching this conclusion, 
the Court reasoned: 
When Tapp was interviewed, he was twenty years old and 
had a high school education. There is no indication that he has an 
unusually low IQ or suffers from any cognitive defects. The 
interviews occurred on several days over the course of a month's 
time. They varied in length, but, with the exception of the January 
11 interview, they took place during daylight hours. Tapp does not 
argue that he was subjected to interrogations of excessive length or 
that he was deprived of food or sleep. Miranda warnings were 
given to Tapp before each interview. All of these factors weigh 
against a finding of involuntariness. 
Nevertheless, Tapp argues that the State used various 
interrogation techniques to confuse him and coerce him into saying 
whatever the police wanted to hear. First, Tapp claims that he was 
induced to confess by unkept promises of leniency. On January 
29, an investigating officer told Tapp that another immunity 
agreement could be worked out if Tapp gave the name of the 
unidentified participant in the crime. However, Tapp never gave the 
information - the name of the unidentified party - on which the offer 
of leniency was predicated. Further, this promise was not 
conditioned on Tapp admitting to having taken an active part in the 
crimes; rather, it was offered despite Tapp's having already 
admitted to actively assisting the principal perpetrators. Therefore, 
this promise could not have induced Tapp's confession. 
Tapp also claims that the police improperly used his religious 
beliefs to induce a confession. In particular, he claims that an 
officer offered him divine forgiveness through confession. Tapp's 
characterization of the conversation is not supported by the record. 
Here, although the officer discussed his own ecclesiastical beliefs 
and offered to take the confession Tapp had expressed a desire to 
make, he prefaced that offer by specifically disclaiming any power 
to grant divine absolution. References to religious sentiments are 
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not coercive per se. Moreover, even if the officer's comments were 
deemed an impermissible appeal to religious sentiment, it would 
not lead to suppression of any statements because Tapp made no 
new admissions after this discussion took place. 
Finally, Tapp alleges that the police used provocative 
questions to heighten his anxiety and stress and employed 
hypothetical questions to encourage speculative responses. Tapp 
has not, however, referred us to any authority suggesting that such 
interrogation techniques are impermissible. The use of hypothetical 
questions is not inherently coercive. The police are allowed to play 
on a suspect's ignorance, fears and anxieties so long as they do 
not magnify these emotionally charged matters to the point where a 
rational decision becomes impossible. 
Having examined the totality of the circumstances, we 
conclude that the district court properly concluded that Tapp's 
disclosures to police were not the product of police coercion. Tapp 
has not shown error in the district court's refusal to suppress 
statements he gave to police on January 7, 10, 18 and 29. 
I.film, 136 Idaho at 364-65, 33 P.3d at 838-39 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted, emphasis in original). 
Because the Court of Appeals determined some of Tapp's statements 
should have been suppressed, it engaged in a harmless error analysis. The 
Court concluded reversal of Tapp's convictions was not required in light of the 
statements Tapp made on January 29, which were properly admitted at trial. 
I.film, 136 Idaho at 365, 33 P.3d at 839. "Because these statements included 
explicit and highly incriminating confessions, ... the erroneous admission of 
other confessions made on other dates was harmless." kl at 365-66, 33 P.3d at 
839-40. Specifically, the Court noted: 
On January 29, while in Dodge's apartment, Tapp admitted that he 
helped restrain Dodge when she was being raped and when Hobbs 
cut her throat. After Tapp and the officers returned to the LEB on 
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the same day, Tapp admitted that he held Dodge's arms down 
while she was being raped and forced to engage in fellatio. He also 
confessed that he was holding Dodge's arms when Hobbs stabbed 
her in the chest which, according to Tapp, was the first time she 
was stabbed. He claimed to have released her arms and stood up 
immediately when that happened, implying no further participation. 
However, later in the same interview he admitted that he was also 
holding Dodge's arms when the unidentified participant stabbed 
her. Thus, in his conversations with police on January 29, Tapp 
admitted to having helped restrain Dodge while she was sexually 
attacked, while Hobbs inflicted the initial stab wound to the chest, 
while the unidentified participant again stabbed her in the chest, 
and while Hobbs cut her throat. We are confident beyond a 
reasonable doubt that if these detailed confessions made on 
January 29 had been the only statements from Tapp heard by the 
jury, the verdict would have been the same. 
To.R.Q, 136 Idaho at 366, 33 P.3d at 840. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed Tapp's conviction and sentences on July 
20, 2001, and the Idaho Supreme Court denied review on October 29, 2001. 
To.R.Q, 136 Idaho at 354, 33 P.3d at 828. 
Course Of Initial Post-Conviction Proceedings, Docket No. 35536 
Tapp filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging 
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal, excessive sentence, and 
a violation of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), because he was not 
sentenced by a jury. (#35536 R., Vol. I, pp.8-20.) Tapp's ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims more specifically alleged trial counsel were ineffective by (1) 
advising him to submit to the January 29 interview in light of the state's position 
that the immunity agreement was void; (2) leaving him "alone with the officers on 
January 29;" (3) failing to accompany him to the crime scene on January 29; (4) 
failing to "investigate and/or present evidence of [Tapp's] diminished mental 
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capacity" at the suppression hearing to support his claim that his "confessions 
were coerced and involuntary;" (5) failing to "present evidence of the 
circumstances of the January 29, 1997, interrogation" to demonstrate he was, in 
fact, in custody on that date; (6) failing to "investigate [Tapp's] diminished mental 
capacity and present evidence of it prior to going to trial, and during the penalty 
phase" so the district court "could have considered whether or not [he] was 
mentally capable to stand trial" and for the district court to consider Tapp's 
"lessened culpability in light of [his] low I.Q.;" (7) failing to call Tapp as a witness 
at trial; and (8) failing to file a Rule 35 motion. (#35536 R., Vol. I, pp.10-11.) 
Tapp further alleged his appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to (1) argue 
the January 29 interview "should have been suppressed as fruit of the poisonous 
tree;" (2) "assert ... that if the statements in which [Tapp] claimed to have used a 
weapon were suppressed, the appellate court would have to vacate the fifteen 
year sentencing enhancement [he] received for use of that weapon;" and (3) 
"raise the issue [sic] 'abuse of discretion', and cumulative error." (#35536 R., 
Vol. I, pp.11-12.) 
Tapp filed two affidavits in support of his petition, his own and one from 
Lisa Barini-Garcia, who appeared pro hac vice with Robert Booker, Tapp's trial 
counsel. (#35536, Affidavit in Support of Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
(hereinafter "First Tapp Aff.") and #35536, Affidavit of Lisa Barini-Garcia 
(hereinafter "Barini-Garcia Aff.") (Exhibits).) In her affidavit, Barini-Garcia 
questioned whether Booker provided effective assistance based on her 
experience with him through Tapp's preliminary hearing and arraignment, after 
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which she withdrew from the case and "advised [Tapp] to hire other counsel." 
(Barini-Garcia Aff.) Specifically, Barini-Garcia noted (1) it appeared Booker was 
unprepared for the preliminary hearing because, although he showed her copies 
of cases he found, the copies were not "highlighted," contained no notations, and 
were not "creased," suggesting to her he had not read them; (2) he did not call 
any witnesses at the preliminary hearing and the preliminary hearing did not last 
as long as she anticipated; (3) she met with Tapp after the preliminary hearing to 
obtain "background information" at which time she "learned" Tapp "had attended 
special education classes and had been evaluated by a mental health 
professional," which Booker had not yet asked him about, a fact Barini-Garcia 
found "troubling;" (4) Booker did not call her before Tapp's arraignment, which 
she thought was "surprising;" (5) prior to the arraignment, Booker asked her to 
research "the issue of Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and lack of 
probable cause at the preliminary hearing," and she advised him the motion 
would "need to be heard prior to the entry of plea," a fact Booker did not "appear 
to be aware of;" and (6) Angie's mother contacted her after the trial and 
"indicated . . . that Mr. Booker's performance in the trial was so deficient she 
almost felt sorry for [Tapp]." (Barini-Garcia Aff., pp.1-4.) 
Tapp also filed a motion for appointment of counsel (#35536 R., Vol. I, 
pp.23-27), which the district court granted (#35536 R., Vol. I, p.32). The state 
thereafter filed an answer (#35536 R., Vol. I, pp.43-44), and motion for summary 
dismissal with a supporting memorandum (#35536 R., Vol. I, pp.46-56). After 
several continuances (#35536 R., Vol. I, pp.65-77, 82, 108), the parties filed a 
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stipulation to stay the post-conviction proceedings to "allow[ ] additional time to 
investigate [Tapp's] claims" (#35536 R., Vol. I, p.112), which the district court 
granted (#35536 R., Vol. I, p.110). 
Three and one-half years later, Tapp filed a Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion for Summary Dismissal which focused on (1) trial counsels' failures to 
present Tapp's cognitive abilities to the court or the jury to explain why he 
confessed and why his confessions were coerced, and (2) Barini-Garcia's 
opinions as expressed in her affidavit filed in support of Tapp's petition. (See 
generally, #35536 R., Vol. II, pp.124-29.) Tapp also filed the Affidavit of Mark D. 
Corgiat, Ph.D (hereinafter "Corgiat Aff.") who evaluated Tapp prior to trial at trial 
counsel's request. (Corgiat Aff., p.2 ,I 2.) Dr. Corgiat opined that trial counsel 
should have "pursu[ed] a competency evaluation based on the existing medical 
records" which indicated Tapp had a "history of resource room assistance, 
possible AD/HD, and other cognitive difficulties," as well as a "history of 
psychotherapy/counseling and chemical dependency treatment." (Corgiat Aff., 
p.2, ,m 5, 11.) Dr. Corgiat also noted Tapp's records "suggested prominent 
Nonverbal Learning Disability characteristics, including deficits in executive 
function abilities consistent with poor planning, impulsivity, poor judgment, and 
an inability to benefit from consequence-based paradigms," all of which Dr. 
Corgiat believed would "raise serious questions about the validity of any 
'confessions' made to police" and which "may have rendered [Tapp] susceptible 
to the interrogation process." (Corgiat Aff., p.2 ,I,I 6, 9.) 
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The district court conducted a hearing on the state's motion for summary 
dismissal after which it entered a written order granting the state's motion as to 
all claims except Tapp's claims that counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to 
investigate and raise issues regarding Tapp's competency; (2) not calling Tapp 
as a witness despite Tapp's alleged request that he do so; and (3) failing to 
present evidence of Tapp's "mental condition" at sentencing. (#35536 R., Vol. II, 
pp. 135-61 . ) The state filed a motion to reconsider the district court's decision to 
not summarily dismiss all of his claims, contending Tapp failed to raise a genuine 
issue of material fact entitling him to a hearing on the three claims the court did 
not summarily dismiss because Tapp failed to (1) establish trial counsel did not 
investigate his competency or show that he was incompetent to stand trial; (2) 
specifically articulate what his trial testimony would have been and therefore 
failed to establish prejudice in relation to this claim; and (3) establish his mental 
condition would have been a significant factor at sentencing. (#35536 R., Vol. II, 
pp.163-80.) The court conducted a hearing on the state's motion to reconsider 
and permitted Tapp to supplement the record with additional evidence. (#35536 
R., Vol. II, p.181.) Tapp subsequently submitted a written objection to the state's 
motion to reconsider (#35536 R., Vol. II, pp.183-86), and an affidavit (Affidavit of 
Christopher Tapp (hereinafter "Second Tapp Aff.") (Exhibit)). In his second 
affidavit, Tapp averred trial counsel (1) never told him he had a right to testify; (2) 
told him he was not going to call him as a witness at the preliminary hearing 
because he did not want the state to be able to use that testimony to prepare for 
trial; (3) did not prepare him to testify at trial; (4) did not "explain to the jury or [the 
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court] at sentencing that [he] ha[s] a diagnosed mental illness and that influenced 
[him] in [his] cooperation with the investigators;" and (5) did not give him the 
"opportunity to testify." (Second Tapp. Aff., pp.2-3.) The state filed written 
responses to both Tapp's objection and his second affidavit. (#35536 R., Vol. 11, 
pp.191-96, 200-07). 
After reconsidering its prior order denying the state's motion for summary 
dismissal of Tapp's claims in relation to his competency, his desire to testify, and 
the presentation of evidence at sentencing, and after reviewing relevant portions 
of the underlying criminal case, the district court concluded summary dismissal 
was appropriate. (#35536 R., Vol. II, pp.209-228.) Tapp filed a timely notice of 
appeal. (#35536 R., Vol. II, pp.224-29.) 
Tapp raised the following issues on appeal: 
A. Did the trial court err in dismissing the claim that trial counsel 
refused to permit Mr. Tapp to testify in his own defense at trial? 
1. In particular, did the court err by analyzing the claims as one 
of ineffective assistance of counsel, and by requiring Mr. Tapp to 
prove the denial of his right to testify prejudiced him under 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), rather than as a 
violation of the right to testify in one's own behalf, which requires 
the Respondent to prove the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 
(1967)? 
2. In the alternative, did Mr. Tapp make a showing of prejudice 
under Strickland? 
B. Did the trial court err in dismissing certain claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel because they raised genuine 
issues of material fact? In particular: 
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1. Did the trial court err in dismissing the claim that trial counsel 
failed to present evidence of the circumstances surrounding the 
January 29 statements? 
2. Did the trial court err in dismissing the claim that trial counsel 
failed to fully investigate and present evidence of Mr. Tapp's mental 
capacity at the suppression hearing? 
C. Did the trial court err in dismissing Mr. Tapp's claim of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel? 
(#35536, Appellant's Opening Brief, pp.6-7.) 
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
Tapp v. State, Docket No. 35536, 2010 Unpublished Opinion No. 412 (Idaho 
App. March 31, 2010) (hereinafter Tapp II). The Court rejected Tapp's claim, 
raised for the first time on appeal, that the district court erred in failing to also 
analyze his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to call him as a witness 
as a direct violation of his right to testify since Tapp "not only pied the issue as an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, but presented the issue to the district 
court as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim." Tapp II at p.12. With 
respect to the claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to call Tapp as a 
witness, the Court affirmed the district court's order summarily dismissing this 
claim. Tapp II at pp.12-15. The Court also affirmed the summary dismissal of 
Tapp's ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim. Tapp II at pp.15-18. 
The Court, however, remanded the case with respect to Tapp's claim that 
counsel was ineffective for "failing to present all of the circumstances of the 
January 29 events in order to demonstrate that Tapp was, in fact, in custody at 
the time of the statements he made on that date," and his claim that counsel was 
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ineffective at the suppression hearing for failing to present evidence of "his 
diminished capacity that" he believed "would have led to a finding that the 
confession was involuntary and should have been suppressed." Tapp II at pp.5-
12.) The basis for the remand was for the district court to consider additional 
facts alleged by Tapp that were not considered "in granting summary dismissal" 
since the district court erroneously concluded Tapp was precluded from 
relitigating the issues based on the Court's determinations on direct appeal 
regarding custody and the voluntariness of Tapp's confession. Tapp II at pp.7-8, 
11-12. Specifically in relation to Tapp's claim that counsel was ineffective for 
failing to submit additional evidence regarding Tapp's mental capacity, the Court 
of Appeals noted: 
As with the custody issue, the post-conviction court 
dismissed the claim on the ground that this Court's determination in 
the direct appeal precluded his re-litigating the issue and was the 
law of the case. We again disagree to the extent that Tapp's post-
conviction claim is, essentially, that because counsel failed to 
present information regarding his diminished mental capacity, 
neither the trial court nor this Court on review possessed the facts 
necessary to make the determination as to the voluntariness of his 
confession. Tapp has attempted to submit additional facts, which 
he contends counsel should have presented at the suppression 
hearing, which would have demonstrated his diminished mental 
capacity and its bearing on the voluntariness of his statements. 
The district court, apparently due to its determination that Tapp 
could not re-litigate the issue,[FNJ did not consider any potential 
effect that the alleged additional facts would have on the question 
of voluntariness. Instead, the district stated that the trial court 
would have considered mental state as a component of the 
analysis of whether the statements were involuntary and coerced 
and, again, noted both the trial court and this Court's prior analysis 
and recitation of the evidence relative to mental condition and 
police coercion. 
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[FN] We note, as with the custody issue, that Tapp's post-
conviction counsel, in essence, invited the district court's 
determination as to the preclusive effect of this Court's prior opinion 
by arguing only that the diminished capacity information should 
have been presented at trial and that the suppression hearing issue 
had already been determined by this Court. 
Tapp II at p.11. 
The Court then noted Tapp's argument that, "if the facts alleged in the 
affidavits and addendum are considered in the light most favorable to him, the 
district court should have granted him an opportunity to present such testimony 
at an evidentiary hearing in order to show diminished mental capacity and its 
effect on whether the confession was voluntary," and concluded, "Since the 
district court did not consider the alleged additional facts in granting 
summary dismissal, we remand for the district court to do so." Tapp II at 
pp.11-12 (emphasis added). 
In its conclusion, however, the Court of Appeals stated, in relevant part: 
The district court's summary dismissal is reversed and 
remanded for an evidentiary hearing on whether Tapp's trial 
counsel was ineffective during the suppression hearing for: (1) 
failing to present evidence Tapp was in custody during the January 
29 interview, and (2) failing to present evidence of Tapp's 
diminished mental capacity to show the confession was involuntary. 
ToQQatp.18. 
Post-Conviction Proceedings Following Remand 
On remand, the state filed a motion for summary dismissal seeking 
dismissal "on the remaining issues as remanded from the Idaho Court of 
Appeals." (R., Vol. I, p.16.) With respect to the claim that counsel was 
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ineffective for failing to present evidence of Tapp's alleged diminished mental 
capacity, the state argued that, even assuming Tapp's mental capacity was 
diminished, "The trial court took [Tapp's] mental state into consideration when it 
made it [sic] original decision." (R., Vol. I, pp.19, 22.) The state further asserted 
"all of the interviews that were recorded and admitted into evidence" showed 
"Tapp knew what was going on, understood the situation, comprehended the 
consequences, understood Miranda and entered into this waiver of his rights 
after having the opportunity to discuss this with his counsel multiple times on 
multiple days and be involved in negotiations concerning this waiver." (R., Vol. II, 
p.23.) 
Regarding the claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to present 
certain facts relevant to custody, the state asserted that, even taking into account 
Tapp's assertions regarding the circumstances surrounding his interview on 
January 29, "Tapp was not in custody." (R., Vol. II, pp.24-24A2.) Tapp filed an 
objection to the state's motion contending, "In order for the court to consider 
evidence on the alleged additional facts," as directed by the Court of Appeals, 
"the court is required to have an evidentiary hearing." (R, Vol. I, p.36; see also 
p.37 ("It is the opinion of the Defendant and defense counsel that an evidentiary 
hearing is required by the Court of Appeals [sic] opinion.").) The state filed a 
reply and the court conducted a hearing on the state's renewed request for 
summary dismissal after which it entered a decision and order granting the 
2 "24A" is the state's own designation of the page in the record between pages 
24 and 25 because the page is not numbered as it appears in the Clerk's Record. 
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state's request for summary dismissal of Tapp's claim that his January 29 
confession was involuntary, but denying the motion as to Tapp's claim regarding 
whether he was in custody during the January 29 interview. (R., Vol. I, pp.26-32, 
39-54; see generally 1/13/2011 Tr.) 
Following the evidentiary hearing on Tapp's custody claim, Tapp filed a 
Motion to Reopen Evidence based on "new evidence" discovered "after the close 
of evidence" involving Officers Brad Landis and Steve Poulter taking Tapp "to a 
Mexican Restaurant on 1st Street," which "could have occurred on January 29, 
1996." (R., Vol. I, p.109.) In response, the court allowed the parties to conduct 
depositions, leaving open the possibility that additional evidence could be 
presented at a later date. (R., Vol. I, pp.112-114.) Approximately one month 
later, Tapp filed an Offer of Rebuttal Evidence citing specific portions of the 
depositions of Officers Poulter and Landis, which the court "received and 
accepted" as "additional evidence." (R., Vol. I, p.143; R., Vol. II, p.262.) 
The court denied post-conviction relief concluding Tapp failed to meet his 
burden of showing any additional information he believes counsel should have 
offered in support of his suppression motion would have altered the court's 
original finding that Tapp was not in custody during the January 29 interview. 
(R., Vol. II, pp.260-271.) Tapp filed a timely notice of appeal from the Judgment 
of Dismissal. (R., Vol. 11, pp.273-277.) 
On July 20, 2012, nine days after the district court entered judgment 
dismissing Tapp's petition, Tapp, using the same district court case number, filed 
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a petition for DNA testing.3 (R., Vol. II, pp.273, 281-284.) In his petition, Tapp 
contended "Y-STR DNA testing technology," which was not available at the time 
of his trial, has "the potential to show that it is more probable than not that he is 
innocent" and that "testing results may also allow law enforcement to identify the 
actual perpetrator of the crime." (R., Vol. II, p.290.) Tapp subsequently filed an 
amended petition reasserting the same grounds for relief and requesting testing 
by a particular laboratory. (R., Vol. II, pp.295-298.) 
On August 14, 2012, the court entered an order denying the DNA petition, 
stating: 
Under I.C. § 19-4902(c)(1), Tapp must present a prima facie 
case that "identity was an issue in the trial in his or her conviction". 
It is the Court's opinion that Tapp cannot meet this prima facie 
requirement. 
There is no dispute that DNA obtained at the crime scene 
did not implicate Tapp. Non-DNA evidence, such as Tapp's 
statements, placed him at the crime scene. The identity of Tapp 
was not an issue at the time of trial but rather the issue was the 
extent of his involvement in the murder. DNA gathered at the crime 
scene was only relevant to the identity of a yet unknown assailant. 
DNA evidence of an unknown individual had no effect on Tapp's 
conviction. 
Section 19-4902(e) provides that the court may allow DNA 
testing if it determines that "the result of the testing has the 
scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence that 
would show that it is more probable than not that the petitioner is 
innocent". This Court cannot make that determination. Again, 
while DNA testing may be relevant in identifying one of the 
assailants, such does not make it more probable that Tapp is 
innocent. There is no dispute that others besides Tapp were 
3 In response to Tapp's initial DNA petition, the state filed a response indicating it 
did not "object to releasing the [DNA] extract currently in possession of the State 
lab," but did object to "releasing any DNA extract to anyone other than Orchid 
Cellmark, LabCorp in Dallas[,] Texas." (R., Vol. II, p.292.) 
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involved in the crime. Further DNA testing of another individual is 
irrelevant. Where Tapp's conviction was unrelated to DNA, there is 
no basis to order further DNA testing. 
Furthermore, as the record reflects this Court has dismissed 
Tapp's petition for post-conviction relief. That petition is no longer 
pending before this Court. To the extent Tapp sought to support 
his petition for post-conviction relief with DNA test results, that time 
has passed. 
(Order on Amended Petition for DNA Testing, filed August 14, 2012 
(Augmentation).) 
Following the court's order denying his request for DNA testing, Tapp filed 
an amended notice of appeal. (R., Vol. II, pp.315-317.) 
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ISSUES 
Tapp states the issues on appeal as: 
A. Did this Court's remand for an evidentiary hearing preclude 
the district court from granting a new motion for summary 
disposition? 
B. If not, did the court err in finding that taking the evidence in 
the light most favorably [sic] to Mr. Tapp, that he has not made a 
prima facie showing that the confession was coerced and 
consequently failed to show there was ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel regarding the determination whether Mr. Tapp's statements 
were involuntary in light of the evidence of diminished capacity? 
C. Did the court violate Mr. Tapp's statutory right to notice and 
due process of law by dismissing the DNA petition without giving 
him twenty days prior notice of its intent to do so? 
(Appellant's Opening Brief ("Appellant's Brief'), pp.10-11.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
1. Has Tapp failed to show that, upon remand, the district court lacked 
authority to grant the state's motion for summary dismissal with respect to his 
claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence regarding Tapp's 
mental capacity to support his request for suppression? 
2. Has Tapp failed to establish he raised a genuine issue of material 
fact entitling him to an evidentiary hearing on his claim that counsel was 
ineffective for failing to present evidence regarding Tapp's mental capacity to 
support his request for suppression? 
3. Did the district court lack jurisdiction to consider Tapp's DNA 
petition after his post-conviction petition was dismissed? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Was Not Required To Conduct An Evidentiary Hearing 
Following The Court Of Appeals' Remand 
A. Introduction 
Tapp contends the district court lacked authority to grant the state's 
request for summary dismissal of his claim that counsel was ineffective in relation 
to his request for suppression on the basis that Tapp's statements were 
involuntary. (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-14.) According to Tapp, the district court 
was required to conduct an evidentiary hearing pursuant to the Court of Appeals' 
opinion following the initial post-conviction appeal. (Id.) Tapp is incorrect. The 
district court correctly concluded that the Court's prior opinion did not preclude a 
finding, upon remand, that Tapp's additional allegations, that were not previously 
considered, failed to create a genuine issue of material fact entitling him to an 
evidentiary hearing on his claim that counsel was ineffective in presenting 
evidence on the voluntariness of Tapp's statements. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The interpretation of court rules is a question of law freely reviewed by the 
appellate court. See Boise Mode, LLC v. Donahoe Pace & Partners, Ltd., 154 
Idaho 99, _, 294 P.3d 1111, 1118 (2013) (citations and quotations omitted) 
("the interpretation of the Rules of Civil Procedure" is "a matter of law over which 
this Court has free review"); State v. Rossignol, 147 Idaho 818, 215 P.3d 538 (Ct. 
22 
App. 2009) ("The interpretation of the rules of evidence is a question of law over 
which we exercise free review."). 
C. The District Court Had Authority To Consider The State's Request For 
Summary Dismissal On Remand 
Tapp argues that, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 38, the "district court 
only had the authority to hold an evidentiary hearing" and that the "state is now 
precluded from arguing that the district court had the authority to reconsider the 
motion to summarily dismiss" under the "'law of the case' doctrine." (Appellant's 
Brief, pp.12-13 (emphasis omitted).) The Idaho Supreme Court's recent opinion 
in State v. Hawkins, 2013 WL 1632100 (April 17, 2013), shows Tapp is incorrect. 
Hawkins was a "permissive interlocutory appeal from the district court's 
determination that the law of the case doctrine prohibited it from making a 
retroactive determination of Faron Hawkins's mental competency when he stood 
trial in January 2008." 2013 WL 1632100 *1. The issue arose after the Court of 
Appeals vacated Hawkins' judgment upon concluding that the district court erred 
in failing to sua sponte order a mental evaluation of Hawkins to evaluate his 
competency to proceed. Isl In its opinion, the Court of Appeals stated: 
"Because it is not possible to retroactively make a determination as to Hawkins' 
competency at the time he was tried, we must vacate the judgment of conviction 
and leave the state free to retry Hawkins if he is found to be competent to stand 
trial." Isl (quoting State v. Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774, 782-83, 229 P.3d 379, 387-
88 (Ct. App. 2009)). 
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"On remand, the district court ordered Hawkins to undergo a competency 
evaluation" and "[bJased on the totality of the evidence presented to it, including 
admitted exhibits and testimony presented during the competency hearing, the 
district court found that Hawkins was both presently competent to stand trial and 
had been competent to stand trial in January 2008." Hawkins, 2013 WL 1632100 
*1 (quotations omitted). Nevertheless, the district court concluded "the law of the 
case required it to retry" Hawkins. ~ On interlocutory appeal, the Idaho 
Supreme Court considered whether the language from the Court of Appeals' 
opinion on direct appeal prohibited the district court from making a retroactive 
determination of Hawkins' competency. ~ at *2. Hawkins, like Tapp, argued 
that (1) the state waived any argument that such a determination was not 
possible since it failed to "address this conclusion in its Petition for Review"; (2) 
the law of the case doctrine prevented the district court from making a retroactive 
competency determination; and (3) "pursuant to I.A.R. 38, the district court only 
had authority to order a new trial." kl at *2-5. The Idaho Supreme Court 
rejected all of Hawkins' arguments. In doing so, the Court explained the law of 
the case doctrine as follows: 
The law of the case doctrine states that, upon an appeal, the 
Supreme Court, in deciding a case presented states in its opinion a 
principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such 
pronouncement becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered 
to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the trial court and 
upon subsequent appeal. However, this Court has noted that the 
law of the case doctrine directs a court's discretion, it does not limit 
the tribunal's power. 
Hawkins, 2013 WL 1632100 *3 (citations, quotations, and ellipses omitted). 
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Further, it is "well established" that the "law of the case" doctrine "is limited 
to the appellate court's legal pronouncements and holdings necessary to decide 
the particular issue presented." Sun Valley Ranches, Inc. v. Prairie Power 
Cooperative Inc., 124 Idaho 125, 129, 856 P.2d 1292, 1296 (Ct. App. 1993) 
(citing Suitts v. First Security Bank of Idaho, N.A., 110 Idaho 15, 21-22, 713 P.2d 
1374, 1380-81 (1985)). Any statement that is not necessary to the ultimate 
disposition of the case "is considered to be dictum and not controlling." kl 
(citations omitted). 
In explaining the proper application of the law of the case doctrine, the 
Court in Hawkins discussed its prior opinion in Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 36 
P.3d 1278 (2001), wherein it rejected a claim that the law of the case doctrine 
limited a district court's discretion on remand. Hawkins, 2013 WL 1632100 *3. In 
Stuart, the Idaho Supreme Court considered whether its statement in Stuart's 
prior appeal - that the state would be "required" on remand to show that its 
surreptitious recordings of confidential conversations between Stuart and his 
attorney "had an origin independent of the eavesdropping" - was "law of the 
case" that prevented the district court from considering the applicability of other 
exceptions to the exclusionary rule. Stuart, 136 Idaho at 495, 36 P.3d at 1283. 
The Court ultimately held that it was not, noting that the statement at issue was 
rendered with "little discussion as to why [the Court] chose to state that the State 
had to prove an 'origin independent of the eavesdropping"' and, although there 
was clearly United States Supreme Court precedent discussing the applicability 
of other exceptions - including the inevitable discovery and attenuated basis 
25 
exceptions - the Idaho Supreme Court had "not previously been presented the 
opportunity to examine [those] exceptions and determine their applicability in 
Idaho." kl There being "no case law from [the Idaho Supreme Court] on the 
subject" the Court declined to presume that its single conclusory statement in 
Stuart's prior appeal - that the state would be "required" on remand to prove an 
independent origin - actually "decided that the inevitable discovery and 
attenuated basis exceptions should not be applied in Idaho." kl 
As in Hawkins and Stuart, the statement in the "Conclusion" section of the 
Court of Appeals' opinion in Tapp's original post-conviction appeal, which was 
inconsistent with its directive that the district court should have considered the 
additional information Tapp submitted before summarily dismissing his petition, 
does not constitute law of the case. As such, it was well within the district court's 
power to do precisely what it did - consider whether the additional information 
Tapp submitted was adequate to avoid summary dismissal of his claim that 
counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence at the suppression hearing 
regarding the voluntariness of his statements. 
Tapp, like Hawkins, also contends that the "mandatory language" of I.AR. 
384 precluded the district court from doing anything but "comply[ing] with the 
specific directives provided by" the Court of Appeals' opinion, which, he 
contends, was conducting an evidentiary hearing. (Appellant's Brief, p.12.) 
4 Idaho Appellate Rule 38(c) provides that when an appellate court opinion 
becomes final, a remittitur shall issue and the "remittitur shall advise the district 
court ... that the opinion has become final and that the district court ... shall 
forthwith comply with the directive of the opinion." 
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Tapp's reliance on I.AR. 38 also fails because, as noted in Hawkins, a Rule 38 
analysis in this context is indistinguishable from whether the law of the case 
doctrine precluded the district court's actions on remand. Hawkins, 2013 WL 
1632100 *5. "Thus, for the purposes of this case, Rule 38 and its use of the word 
'directive' does not require additional analysis of this issue." 1st 
Finally, the Court in Hawkins rejected the argument, also made by Tapp, 
that the state waives the ability to challenge whether a district court's actions on 
remand were or were not barred by the law of the case doctrine. Hawkins, 2013 
WL 1632100 *2. In Hawkins, the Court concluded no such waiver existed since, 
although the state "could have appealed the original Court of Appeals's decision 
that a retroactive competency determination was impossible," that was not the 
issue raised in the state's interlocutory appeal. 1st at *3. Rather, the issue was 
whether the Court of Appeals' statement was the law of the case - an issue that, 
by its nature, would not be addressed in the original appeal. See ~. Capps v. 
Wood, 117 Idaho 614, 618, 790 P.2d 395, 399 (Ct. App. 1990) ("law of the case" 
doctrine precludes consideration for first time on subsequent appeal of "errors 
which arose prior to the first appeal"). The same is true in Tapp's case. Whether 
the language in the "Conclusion" section of the Court of Appeals' opinion was law 
of the case that obligated the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing was 
properly considered by the district court and may be addressed by this Court at 
this juncture. The state did not waive the issue in Hawkins and it has not been 
waived in this case. Tapp's claim to the contrary fails. 
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II. 
Tapp Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing His 
Claim That Counsel Was Ineffective In Relation To Tapp's Request For 
Suppression On The Basis That His Statements Were Involuntary Due To His 
Allegedly Diminished Mental Capacity 
A Introduction 
Tapp alternatively asserts the district court erred in summarily dismissing 
his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to present certain evidence to 
support Tapp's claim that his statements on January 29 were involuntary due to 
his alleged diminished capacity. (Appellant's Brief, pp.15-20.) More specifically, 
Tapp argues that the district court applied an incorrect test to Tapp's claim. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.15-20.) Application of the correct legal standards to the 
evidence presented shows Tapp has failed to show he was entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing on this claim. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 
exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the 
requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 
(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 
1999). Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material fact 
exists. Edwards v. Conchemco. Inc., 111 Idaho 851,852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 
(Ct. App. 1986). 
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C. Tapp Failed To Show He Was Entitled To An Evidentiary Hearing On His 
Claim That Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Present Certain 
Evidence To Support His Claim That His Statements Were Involuntary 
In order to establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, a post-conviction petitioner must demonstrate both deficient 
performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 
(1989). An attorney's performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls 
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct is within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance. Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 
(1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401,406,775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). 
To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have 
been different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 
(1988); Cowgerv. State, 132 Idaho 681,685,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 1999). 
Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific facts, do not make out 
a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel. Roman v. State, 125 
Idaho 644, 649, 873 P.2d 898, 903 (Ct. App. 1994). 
In paragraph 9(d) of his petition, Tapp asserts "[t]rial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance of counsel when, during the suppression hearing, he failed 
to investigate and/or present evidence of [Tapp's] diminished mental capacity ... 
in support of [his] claim that [his] confessions were coerced and involuntary." 
(#35536 R., Vol. I, p.10.) In support of this claim, Tapp submitted an affidavit 
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from Dr. Corgiat who opined that Tapp's "mental health issues," which consist of 
"a history of resource room assistance, possible AD/HD," other unidentified 
"cognitive difficulties," and a "history of psychotherapy/counseling and chemical 
dependency treatment," "would raise serious questions about the validity of any 
'confessions' made to police." (Corgiat Aff., p.2 ,rn 5, 9.) Dr. Corgiat further 
opined that Tapp's "Nonverbal Learning Disability coupled with the ongoing 
interrogations that he underwent may have rendered him susceptible to the 
interrogation process." (Corgiat Aff., p.21[ 9.) In support of this claim, Tapp also 
apparently submitted "several academic reports, including report cards indicating 
very poor performance in school, especially in core subjects; scores from the 
Iowa Tests of Basic Skills indicating Tapp frequently scored in the lowermost 
percentiles for a variety of subjects; and reports indicating that Tapp had 
attended special education classes."5 (See R., Vol. II, p.143.) 
In vacating the summary dismissal of this claim, the Court of Appeals 
noted the "additional evidence regarding [Tapp's] mental capacity," not 
considered by the district court, as found in Tapp's report cards, testing scores, 
and participation in special education classes, as well as the allegations in 
Tapp's second affidavit and addendum and the affidavits of Lisa Barini-Garcia 
and Dr. Corgiat and remanded the claim in order for the court to "consider the 
alleged additional facts." Tapp II at pp.10-12. The district court considered the 
'"additional evidence' asserted by Tapp as to his mental capacity," cited the 
relevant legal standards applicable to voluntariness claims, and concluded: 
5 It appears these documents have not been included in the record on appeal. 
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It is the Court's opinion that much of the evidence proffered 
by Tapp is of limited utility. There is nothing in the record that 
equates any learning disabilities to an inability to give a voluntary 
confession. Additionally, there is no evidence to support a 
conclusion that learning disabilities have any effect on an 
individual's will to resist police interrogation. 
That Lisa Barini-Garcia had "questions" about Tapp's 
intelligence and maturity is not particularly probative to the issue. 
Barini-Garcia's testimony does not establish any diminished 
capacity (even assuming she had the qualifications to do so) 
relating to the voluntariness of a confession. 
T app's own testimony about anger and psychological 
problems also misses the mark when considering the voluntariness 
of a confession. Again, the mere presence of psychological issues 
does not mandate or support a leap in logic that a confession was 
involuntary. 
In examining Tapp, Dr. Corgiat appears to have found 
learning disabilities and "possible" cognitive difficulties along with 
chemical dependency. That Corgiat thought that Tapp's mental 
status raised "questions" about the validity of the confession or 
"may" have made Tapp susceptible to the interrogation process 
does not establish a link between Tapp's mental status and an 
alleged involuntary confession. Corgiat merely speculates that 
there may have been a connection. Furthermore, Corgiat does not 
accurately frame the issue being considered. Being "susceptible" 
to interrogation is not a violation of due process and does not make 
a confession involuntary. 
(R., Vol. I, pp.43-52.) 
The district court then considered "the circumstances of a voluntary or 
involuntary confession as set out in [Woodward v. State, 142 Idaho 98, 106-107, 
123 P.3d 1254, 1262-1263 (Ct. App. 2005)], and found they did not support 
Tapp's assertion that his statements were involuntary. (R., Vol. I, pp.52-53.) 
Significantly, the district court also noted "a critical element of an involuntary 
confession is police coercion," and found "no evidence that the officers who 
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inteNiewed Tapp were aware of some diminished capacity and tried to exploit it." 
(R., Vol. I, p.53.) The district court further noted, "On at least four occasions, a 
court has reviewed the January 29 video taped [sic] inteNiew and confession and 
found no police coercion," specifically referencing the Court of Appeals' 
conclusion in To.Im that "the district court properly concluded that Tapp's 
disclosures to police were not the product of police coercion." (R., Vol. I, p.53.) 
In concluding its analysis, the court stated: 
When considering the totality of the evidence, this Court 
concludes that Tapp has failed to raise a genuine issue to the effect 
that his confession was involuntary and that his will was overcome 
by police coercion. Indeed, it is this Court's opinion that no 
reasonable person could view the videotaped inteNiews and 
conclude that Tapp's will was overcome by police coercion. The 
record does not support a claim that any alleged mental weakness 
was exploited by coercive police tactics. The inteNiews took place 
over several days, with Tapp withholding information, changing 
stories, and/or giving some accurate information such that follow-up 
inteNiews were desired. It is evident from the video tapes that 
Tapp fully appreciated the seriousness of the matter and 
understood the ramifications and consequences to him for his 
involvement. Evidence of learning disabilities or psychological 
issues does not alter this conclusion. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that Tapp has failed to present a 
prima facie case that his trial attorney was deficient in failing to 
present certain evidence as to alleged diminished capacity at the 
time of the suppression hearing. This Court further concludes that 
even if such evidence was presented, it would not have altered the 
trial court's decision denying suppression of the January 29 
confession. 
(R., Vol. I, pp.53-54.) 
Tapp claims the court "erred in its analysis," arguing the court "was not 
required to find that the police exploited [his] mental deficiencies in order to find 
the statements were coerced," but "[rJather, it was to consider the evidence of his 
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mental condition as part of the totality of the circumstances when determining 
whether there was police overreaching and whether [his] will was overborne." 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.15-16.) Contrary to Tapp's claim, the district court clearly 
considered the totality of the circumstances and its conclusion was consistent 
with the applicable legal standards. 
"[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a 
confession is not 'voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment." Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986). 
Indeed, "coercive government misconduct was the catalyst for th[e] [Supreme] 
Court's seminal confession case, Brown v. Mississippi," 297 U.S. 278 (1936), 
and "the cases considered by th[e] Court" post-Brown "have focused upon the 
crucial element of police overreaching." Connelly, 479 U.S. at 163-164. "While 
each confession case has turned on its own set of factors justifying the 
conclusion that police conduct was oppressive, all have contained a substantial 
element of coercive police conduct." ~ at 164. "Absent police conduct causally 
related to the confession, there is simply no basis for concluding that any state 
actor has deprived a criminal defendant of due process of law." ~; see also 
State v. Valero, 153 Idaho 910, 912, 285 P.3d 1014, 1016 (Ct. App. 2012) ("In 
order to find a violation of a defendant's due process rights by virtue of an 
involuntary confession, coercive police conduct is necessary."). 
"The proper inquiry is to look to the totality of the circumstances and then 
ask whether the defendant's will was overborne by the police conduct." State v. 
Stone, 2013 WL 1955792 *3 (Ct. App. 2013) (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 
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U.S. 279, 287 (1991 ); State v. Troy, 124 Idaho 211, 214, 858 P.2d 750, 753 
(1993)). Relevant factors to consider in determining whether a defendant's 
statements are voluntary include whether Miranda warnings were given, the 
defendant's age, education, and intelligence, the length of detention, the 
repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, and the use of physical 
punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep. Schneckloth v. 
Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) (internal citations omitted); Stone, 2013 
WL 1955792 *3 (citations omitted). Importantly, the absence or presence of any 
one factor is not determinative. ~ Thus, for example, a defendant's claim of 
mental deficiencies does not, in and of itself, render his statements involuntary, 
much less establish coercion. See, gJL, State v. Doe, 131 Idaho 709, 963 P.2d 
392 (Ct. App. 1998) (concluding defendant's confession was voluntary 
notwithstanding his allegations that he did not appreciate his right to counsel, 
read at a fourth grade level, believed he would be arrested if he did not confess, 
and suffered from ADD). 
"If the defendant's free will is undermined by threats or through direct or 
implied promises, then the statement is not voluntary and is inadmissible." 
Stone, 2013 WL 1955792 *3 (citations omitted). "Promises of leniency, especially 
vague assurances of leniency, do not necessarily render a confession 
involuntary. Rather, they are only a factor to be considered under the totality of 
the circumstances." ~ (citations and quotations omitted). "The reviewing court 
must determine whether the statements made to the defendant were sufficient to 
undermine the defendant's free will. Promises made by law enforcement officers 
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without the authority to fulfill such promises may render a confession 
involuntary." kt 
Tapp acknowledges "police overreaching is necessary to establish 
involuntariness," and claims this prerequisite was satisfied, contending "there 
was a finding of police misconduct" as reflected in the Court of Appeals' 
statement "in the first post-conviction appeal" that the district court "found the 
officers did offer an implied promise of leniency." (Appellant's Brief, p.16 
(emphasis added).) Unquestionably, the Court of Appeals, in its opinion in ToQQ 
ll. stated: 'The court found the officers did offer an implied promise of leniency, 
but the explicit promise of leniency was conditioned on Tapp's statements being 
accurate and him not having caused any physical harm to the victim." Tapp II at 
p.9. However, this finding must be evaluated in context. 
In addressing Tapp's suppression motion argument that his statements 
were involuntary due, in part, to "implied promises of leniency during the 
interviews and explicit promises of leniency .. in the immunity and settlement 
agreements" (#25295 R., p.293), the district court stated: 
Having reviewed the tapes of the police interviews, the court 
finds that there were implied promises of leniency made by the 
police. However, as with deceit and trickery, a promise of leniency 
alone is not enough to make a confession involuntary. State v. 
McLean, 123 Idaho 108, 112, 844 P.2d 1358, 1362 (Ct. App. 1992). 
As already discussed, Tapp had the assistance of counsel which 
would tend to lessen the effect of any implied promises of leniency. 
Any explicit promise of leniency contained in either the 
immunity agreement or the settlement agreement would be offset 
by the provisions in those documents which required that Tapp give 
truthful and complete information and the provisions which 
rendered the agreements void if it was discovered that Tapp was 
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not being truthful or that he had caused actual physical harm to 
Dodge. These provisions make it clear that the State was imposing 
requirements on, and creating exceptions to, any promise of 
leniency contained in those agreements. Presumably, Tapp and 
his attorneys reviewed the agreements and were aware of their 
contents. 
(#25295 R., p.295). 
It is unclear how any implied promise of leniency was sufficient to 
overcome Tapp's free will given the existence of the express promises of 
leniency in the immunity and settlement agreements to which he previously 
agreed. In any event, both the district court and the Court of Appeals, being fully 
aware of the promises of leniency, both express and implied, found Tapp's 
statements were voluntary. Indeed, in addressing this issue on direct appeal, the 
Court of Appeals expressly noted the standards from Fulminante and Connelly. 
set forth above, and stated: 
... Tapp argues that the State used various interrogation 
techniques to confuse him and coerce him into saying whatever the 
police wanted to hear. First, Tapp claims that he was induced to 
confess by unkept promises of leniency. On January 29, an 
investigating officer told Tapp that another immunity agreement 
could be worked out if Tapp gave the name of the unidentified 
participant in the crime. However, Tapp never gave the 
information-the name of the unidentified party-on which the offer 
of leniency was predicated. Further, this promise was not 
conditioned on Tapp admitting to having taken an active part in the 
crimes; rather, it was offered despite Tapp's having already 
admitted to actively assisting the principal perpetrators. Therefore, 
this promise could not have induced Tapp's confession. 
Ifilm., 136 Idaho at 364-65, 33 P.3d at 838-39. 
Thus, the Court of Appeals has already resolved the coercion claim 
against Tapp. Although the Court of Appeals did not, on direct appeal, factor in 
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Tapp's alleged cognitive deficits since that evidence had not yet been presented, 
adding that information into the calculus does not change the result because 
there is still an absence of coercion. That the "promise of leniency could not 
have induced Tapp's confession" because he never gave the information ... on 
which the offer of leniency was predicated" and because the "promise was not 
conditioned on Tapp admitting to having taken an active part in the crimes" is 
true regardless of his mental capacity. 
Even assuming it is still necessary to re-evaluate the Bustamante factors 
to include the alleged diminished mental capacity, notwithstanding the absence 
of coercion, Tapp has failed to show he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on 
this claim. See Stone, 2013 WL 1955792 *10 ("While Stone's suggestibility and 
mental condition alone are not sufficient to justify suppression absent a showing 
of police coercion; nonetheless, it is a factor the court should have considered 
under the totality of circumstances.") The district court correctly concluded that 
the additional information provided by Tapp was inadequate for purposes of 
establishing a prima facie case that his statements on January 29 were 
involuntary. Tapp's claim that the district court denied him an evidentiary hearing 
because he failed to "present a prima facie case that the police were aware of his 
mental condition and then exploited it" (Appellant's Brief, p.19) ignores the record 
and the breadth of the district court's analysis. Moreover, Tapp has failed to 
establish that it was improper for the court to recognize the fact that there was no 
exploitation of any "mental weakness." Ironically, had law enforcement engaged 
in such exploitation, Tapp would surely argue his will was overborne by coercion. 
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Regardless, what the district court was required to consider on remand was 
Tapp's alleged diminished mental capacity. The court expressly did so and 
concluded that factor would not have changed the result with respect to Tapp's 
suppression motion. Accordingly, counsel was not deficient in failing to present 
that information in support of the suppression motion and Tapp suffered no 
prejudice as a result of counsel's failure to do so. 
Tapp has failed to establish the district court erred in summarily dismissing 
his claim that counsel was ineffective in the presentation of evidence to support 
his claim that his January 29 statements should have been suppressed on the 
basis that the statements were involuntary. 
111. 
The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction To Consider Tapp's DNA Petition, Filed 
After The Judgment Dismissing His Case 
A. Introduction 
Tapp contends the district court erred in dismissing his DNA petition 
without first giving him 20 days notice. (Appellant's Brief, pp.20-22.) Tapp's 
claim fails because the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition in 
the first instance.6 
6 Even if the district court had jurisdiction to consider Tapp's DNA petition during 
the pendency of this appeal, the state does not concede that the 20-day notice 
requirement in I.C. § 19-4906 applies to DNA petitions filed pursuant to I.C. § 19-
4902(b). The state further submits that even if the 20-day notice requirement 
applies to DNA petitions, the failure to give Tapp notice prior to dismissal was 
harmless because, as found by the district court, Tapp's petition failed to comply 
with the requirements of I.C. § 19-4902(b) and no amount of notice could have 
cured the deficiency identified by the district court. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
'"Whether a court lacks jurisdiction is a question of law that may be raised 
at any time, and over which appellate courts exercise free review."' State v. 
Dieter, 153 Idaho 730, 733, 291 P.3d 413, 416 (2012) (quoting State v. Jones, 
140 Idaho 75, 77, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004)). "A question of jurisdiction is 
fundamental; it cannot be ignored when brought to [the Court's] attention and 
should be address prior to considering the merits of an appeal." H&V 
Engineering v. Bd. of Professional Engineers & Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646, 
648, 747 P.2d 55, 57 (1987) (citations omitted). 
The interpretation and application of statutes and court rules present 
questions of law subject to de novo review. State v. Jones, 151 Idaho 943, 946, 
265 P.3d 1155, 1158 (Ct. App. 2011); See Boise Mode. LLC v. Donahoe Pace & 
Partners. Ltd., 154 Idaho 99, _, 294 P.3d 1111, 1118 (2013) (citations and 
quotations omitted) ("the interpretation of the Rules of Civil Procedure" is "a 
matter of law over which this Court has free review"); State v. Rossignol, 147 
Idaho 818, 215 P.3d 538 (Ct. App. 2009) ("The interpretation of the rules of 
evidence is a question of law over which we exercise free review."). 
C. The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction To Consider Tapp's DNA Petition 
Filed In This Case During The Pendency Of This Appeal 
"Once an appeal has been perfected the district court is divested of 
jurisdiction and the proceedings are stayed during the pendency of the appeal." 
H&V Eng'g, Inc., 113 Idaho at 648, 747 P.2d at 57 (citation omitted). The 
exceptions to this "general rule" are "specifically enumerated in Rule 13" of the 
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Idaho Appellate Rules. kl Specifically, Rule 13(b) sets forth the bounds of a 
district court's authority during the pendency of a civil appeal. That authority 
does not include the ability to consider a new petition. 
Although the district court addressed whether Tapp's DNA petition 
satisfied the requirements of I.C. § 19-4902(b), and although the state agreed to 
DNA testing, this Court is "obligated to address" a jurisdictional question, "when 
applicable," and the "parties cannot confer jurisdiction upon the court by 
stipulation, agreement, or estoppel." H&V Eng'g, Inc., 113 Idaho at 648, 747 
P.2d at 57 (citations omitted). Because the district court lacked authority to 
consider Tapp's DNA petition, filed in this case during the pendency of Tapp's 
appeal, the district court's dismissal of the petition is not properly before the 
Court.7 
7 The state also submits that Tapp's DNA petition should have initiated a new 
proceeding and was not properly filed in his post-conviction case. See I.C. §19-
4902(a) ("A proceeding is commenced by filing an application verified by the 
applicant with the clerk of the district court in which the conviction took place."); 
I.C. § 19-4902(b) ("A petitioner may, at any time, file a petition before the trial 
court that entered the judgment of conviction in his or her case for the 
performance of ... (DNA) testing . . .. The clerk shall docket the application 
upon its receipt .... ") This filing defect is attributable to Tapp, who used the case 
number assigned to his post-conviction case in preparing his DNA petition. (R., 
Vol. 11, p.281.) 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
summary dismissal of Tapp's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 5th day of June 2013. 
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